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Abstract
 In this article, I ﬁ rst clarify the basis of the development of the crisis in the structure of the US 
housing loan market. Next, I discuss the sequence of the events marking the progress of the crisis, 
including the collapse of the subprime loan market, the bankruptcy of mortgage banks, the bail-out of 
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and AIG by the US government, the economic crisis of Iceland and developing 
nations, and the downfall of GM and Chrysler. In the latter half of the paper, I analyze the impact of the 
crisis on the East Asian economy. In conclusion, let me consider the implications of this crisis and the 
outlook of the world economy.
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Introduction
The ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007-08 that was triggered by the US subprime loan problem 
spread to the global ﬁ nancial market. It started with the bankruptcy of mortgage 
banks in 2007, and was followed by a sequence of economic events, including the 
bail-out of Government Support Enterprises （Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae） by the US 
government, the disappearance of ﬁ ve large investment banks, enormous losses and the 
management crisis of giant commercial banks. The impact of the crisis spread to the 
real economy in the form of a credit shrinkage, declining stock prices, and depression 
of consumption. The real economy has been struggling with rising unemployment and 
a negative growth rate. The crisis is not conﬁ ned to the United States, but extends to 
European nations, and has also had a detrimental eﬀ ect on developing nations.
　In this article, I ﬁ rst clarify the basis of the development of the crisis in the 
structure of the US housing loan market. Next, I discuss the sequence of the events 
marking the progress of the crisis, including the collapse of the subprime loan market, 
the bankruptcy of mortgage banks, the bail-out of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and AIG 
by the US government, the economic crisis of Iceland and developing nations, and the 
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downfall of GM and Chrysler. In the latter half of the paper, I analyze the impact of 
the crisis on the East Asian economy. In conclusion, let me consider the implications of 
this crisis and the outlook of the world economy.
　When I wrote the ﬁ rst draft of this article in February 2009, we could not exactly 
understand the reasons why the crisis happened and could not predict the 
consequences of the crisis. There were not enough books and studies written on the 
crisis. However, recently a lot of books and articles have been published and the 
causes and the processes of the expansion of the crisis have been gradually clariﬁ ed. 
Among these studies, Attali （2008）， Stiglitz （2010） and Krugman （2012） point out 
insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial regulations and unsuitable ﬁ nancial policies as the fundamental 
causes of the crisis. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission （2011） contains a mass of 
testimonies of the people who worked in the ﬁ nancial institutions concerning the crisis. 
Ueda （2010） gives a comprehensive analysis of the crisis including some econometric 
analyses. Hattori （2011） points out the fundamental problems of the market-oriented 
economic policies. M. Ito （2010） compares the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007-2008 with the 
Great Depression of 1929, the Collapse of the Bubble Economy of 1990 in Japan and 
the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997. This book analyzes the fundamental instability of 
the global ﬁ nancial system.
The Housing loan market in the United States
The global economic crisis of 2007-08 is rooted in the subprime loan crisis in the 
United States. A subprime loan is the one whose interest rate is higher than the prime 
rate. It is oﬀ ered to an individual who does not qualify for a loan at the prime rate due 
to their poor credit history. The rising default rate of this type of loan triggered the 
current ﬁ nancial crisis. Therefore, to understand the causes of the ﬁ nance crisis, we 
should ﬁ rst brieﬂ y explain the structure of the US housing loan market.
　The housing loan balance of the United States was approximately 10 trillion dollars 
at the end of 2007. Housing loans are classiﬁ ed into three categories, according to the 
borrower’s risk. These are Prime, Alt-A （Alternative A）， and Subprime.
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　A borrower’s risk is measured using a FICO score1）（300 points - 850 points） developed 
by the Fair Isaac Company. A loan is considered ‘prime’ if the borrower’s score is 
over 680 points and ‘subprime’， if the borrower’s scores is below 660 points or 620 
points. If necessary documents, including income veriﬁ cation, are not available, even 
though the borrower’s score meets the criteria of a prime loan, the loan is considered 
to be ‘Alt-A’. As shown in Table 1, the total balance of the prime loans was 7.5 
trillion dollars, and those of Alt-A and subprime loans, 1.4 trillion dollars and 1.1 trillion 
dollars, respectively.
Table 1  Balance of Housing Loan in the United States
Types of Loans Balance
Prime 7.5 trillion
Alt-A 1.4 trillion
Subprime 1.1 trillion
Source: MBA （Mortgage Bankers Association）
　Housing loans are lent by mortgage banks, commercial banks, and savings and loan 
associations （S&L）（Fig. 1）. Among these, mortgage banks raise capital from the 
government-supported enterprises （Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, referred to 
subsequently as GSEs or Agencies）， commercial banks, and investment banks, etc., 
taking commissions. In the US, the largest percentage of housing loans is provided by 
these mortgage banks.
　In the US, approximately 60 percent of the mortgages is securitized and issued in 
the form of residential Mortgage Backed Securities （MBSs）. Mortgages are sold by 
mortgage banks, commercial banks, and S&Ls to Agencies （Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and Ginnie Mae2）） and investment banks, etc. In principle, however, agencies only buy 
prime loans. Alt-As and subprime loans are bought by private investment banks etc.
 1） FICO is an analytics software company and was founded in 1956. The FICO score was ﬁ rst introduced in 
1986 and is used by the vast majority of banks and credit grantors.
 2） The Federal National Mortgage Association （Fannie Mae） and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
（Freddie Mac） are government-sponsored enterprises （GSEs） and the Government National Mortgage 
Association （Ginnie Mae） is a wholly owned government corporation.
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Fig. 1　Structure of housing loan market in the United States （in billion of U.S. dollars）
　Mortgages are securitized as MBSs by Agencies and investment banks, and are sold 
to investment banks and other ﬁ nancial institutions. The majority of MBSs are issued 
and guaranteed by the Agencies. These are called Agency MBSs. Other MBSs are 
securitized by private ﬁ nancial institutions. （The ratio of private MBSs （Non-Agency 
MBSs） increased rapidly during the expansion of the real estate bubble after 2003.）
　Investment banks re-securities MBSs bought from Agencies and other ﬁ nancial 
institutions, and repackage them as CDOs （Collateralized Debt Obligation）. CDOs are 
complex instruments that combine the three kinds of mortgages （Prime, Alt-A and 
Subprime）, as well as other loans including the auto loans and the consumers’ loans. 
There are classes of CDOs, according to the size of the risk and return: （1） Senior 
（low-risk low-return）, （2） Mezzanine （medium-risk and medium-return）, and （3） 
Equity （high-risk and high-return）. Among these, Senior CDOs are evaluated as high-
ranking AAAs, and the Mezzanine CDOs are ranked as BB. These CDOs are bought 
by hedge funds and ﬁ nancial institutions for speculative purpose （Fig. 1）. Hedge funds 
own about the half of these and the rest are owned by banks, asset managers and 
insurance companies, respectively holding 25%, 20%, and 10% （Fig. 2）．
　Among these ﬁ nancial institutions, consumer banks are regulated by the Federal 
Reserve Board （FRB）, and investment banks are regulated by The Securities and 
Exchange Commission （SEC）. However, Structured Investment Vehicles （SIVs） that 
are established by commercial and investment banks, as well as their subsidiary hedge 
funds, are not regulated. These SIVs and hedge funds are referred to as a “Shadow 
Banking System”. （Fig. 3） The Shadow Banking System buys MBSs and CDOs that 
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yield long-term high interest rates, issues commercial papers （ABCP3）） using the CDOs 
as collateral, borrows short term inter-bank （between the ﬁ nancial institutions） money 
at low interest rate, and again buys CDOs. In this way, hedge funds and SIVs can 
have tens of times as many transactions as they could with their own capital. This 
mechanism enables large transactions using relatively small amounts of one’s own 
capital, and is called the “Principle of Leverage”. It is important to note that the 
existence of this “Shadow Banking System4）” was an important factor in the worsening 
of the global ﬁ nancial crisis.
　For instance, let us assume that a hedge fund’s capital is 10 billion dollars, and the 
diﬀ erence between short- and long-term interest rates is 4%. If the hedge fund uses 
only its own capital, the expected proﬁ t is only 400 million dollars. However, if the 
fund, by using “leverage”, is able to invest ten times the amount it could using its own 
capital alone, the proﬁ t would be 4 billion dollars, or a return on investment of 40%.
However, a problem arises if the hedge fund suﬀ ers a loss. If the fund loses half of its 
100 billion dollar investment, i.e. 50 billion dollars, it stands to owe ﬁ ve times as much 
 3） Asset-backed commercial paper （ABCP） is a form of commercial paper that is collateralized by other ﬁ nancial 
assets. It is used for short-term ﬁ nancing needs.
 4） “Globally, shadow banking was $65 trillion in 2011, compared to $26 trillion in 2002, or on average 25% of 
ﬁ nancial assets and 111% of aggregate GDP.”（Claessens S. et. al （2012, p. 6））
Fig. 2  Buyers of CDO （percentage）
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, Oct 2007, p.15
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as it owns and the fund would become insolvent.
The Real Estate Bubble and Its Collapse
Among the three types of housing loans, the proportion of the subprime loans 
expanded rapidly in 2004. What was the reason for this expansion? One reason was the 
fall in US interest rates. In the early 2000’s, the collapse of the IT bubble and the 9.11 
attacks in 2001 fueled anxiety about a coming recession, which led the FRB to reduce 
the interest rate. As a result, the FF rate （Federal Funds Rate） fell to 1% （Fig. 4）. 
The oversupply of capital in the ﬁ nancial market ensuing from such a monetary 
expansion spilled over into the housing loan market. During this period, enterprises 
raised capital by direct ﬁ nancing through the issue of stocks and bonds.
　Another reason for the increase in subprime loans was the appearance of a 
new-type loan which enabled low-income borrowers to have a reduced payment in the 
early stages of the loan repayment. For the majority of subprime loans of this type, 
interest rate is ﬁ xed for the ﬁ rst two years and allowed to ﬂ uctuate thereafter. This 
contrasts with the majority of prime loans, which generally have 30-year ﬁ xed interest 
Fig. 3  “Shadow Banking System”
Source: Kaneko-David, The Global Financial Crisis, p.11
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rates. Furthermore, the ultimate type of low-payment loan, called an Interest Only 
（IO） loan appeared during this time. With this type of loan, borrowers were only 
required to pay the interest in the ﬁ rst few years. Consequently, while over 70% of 
prime loans have a 30-year ﬁ xed interest rate, the majority of subprime loans are 
adjustable-rate over the long-term, with 54.8 having two-year ﬁ xed interest rates and 
6.6% with three-year ﬁ xed rates （Fig. 5）. In the latter subprime loans, since the 
interest rate increases after two or three years, sometimes drastically, borrowers are 
often no longer able to pay their mortgages and they must sell or go into foreclosure.
　Because real estate prices in the US had been on an upward trend since 1990 
（Fig. 6）, these new loan types encouraged lower-income individuals to take out housing 
loans as soon as possible. These borrowers believed that if they could pay their 
subprime loans for several years, they could reﬁ nance with a prime loan, and even if 
they could no longer pay their mortgage, they could always proﬁ t by selling oﬀ  their 
homes.
　The rapid expansion of the housing market due to the inﬂ ow of capital and the 
ready availability of subprime loans caused a sharp price increase in house prices 
starting in 2004 which could be called a “bubble”. Fig. 6 shows the percentage change 
 
Fig. 4　FF rate （%）
Source: FRB
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Fig. 5  Types of Prime and Subprime Loan
Source: Kurahashi-Kobayashi, A Correct Way of Thinking for the Subprime Loan Problem, p.60
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in the house price index over the past three decades. Both the Case-Shiller and 
OFHEO house price indices5） indicate that housing prices rose by a rate of 10% over 
the previous year from 2002 to the ﬁ rst half of 2006, but that the rate decreased 
rapidly starting the end of 2006, falling below zero in 2007.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
㻴㼛㼡㼟㼕㼚㼓㻌㼘㼛㼍㼚 㻹㻮㻿 㻭㼘㼠㻙㻭㻛㼟㼡㼎㼜㼞㼕㼙㼑 㻭㼘㼠㻙㻭㻛㻿㼡㼎㼜㼞㼕㼙㼑㻌㻹㻮㻿
 
Fig. 7  Amounts of Housing Loans （in billion of U.S. dollars）
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, Mortgage Stability Annual 2008
　Fig. 7 shows the total dollar amounts of housing loans, MBS issues, Alt-A/Subprime 
loans, and the level of securitization of Alt-A/Subprime. We can see that the total 
value of housing loans reached a maximum in 2003, while the total and the relative 
proportion of Alt-A/Subprime loans peaked in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, it is evident 
that the securitization rate for the Alt-A/Subprime loans is very high （note the 
proximity of the Alt-A/Subprime MBS line to that of the Alt-A/Subprime）．
　The Alt-A and subprime loans enable banks and other lenders to lend money to 
individuals who otherwise would have had diﬃ  culty getting ﬁ nancing. The ﬁ nancial 
crisis might not have occurred if houses prices had kept increasing. However, the 
 5） The US Federal Housing Finance Agency （formerly Oﬃ  ce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight a.k.a. 
OFHEO） publishes the HPI （House Price Index）， a quarterly broad measure of the movement of single-
family house prices.
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housing market bubble collapsed in 2006.
　The interest rate of the majority of subprime loans was ﬁ xed for the ﬁ rst two or 
three years and became adjustable after that. The FF interest rate, which was 1% in 
January 2004, gradually rose to 5.25% by January 2007. As a result, the average 
interest rate of all housing loans also increased, as did the percentage of delinquent 
loans （Fig. 8）. At the same time, the bubble collapsed, and the house price index fell 
precipitously, eventually showing negative growth in 2007 （Fig. 6）. The percentage of 
delinquent subprime loans rose rapidly （Fig. 8）. It is natural that this tendency should 
be the most remarkable in the ﬂ oating rate at the subprime.
Fig. 8  Percentage of Delinquent Housing Loans
Source: Kurahashi and Kobayashi ‘Idea with correct subprime problem’ p.77
　The rise in the percentage of delinquent loans, including housing loans, was a fatal 
blow to highly leveraged ﬁ nancial institutions. In addition, investment banks and hedge 
funds suﬀ ered massive losses as the prices of securities held by these institutions fell 
drastically due to the downward adjustment of MBS and CDOs values by the credit 
rating agencies.
　As an example, the following table shows the drop in the value of assets between 
the 2nd quarter and third quarters of 2008 announced by Lehman Brothers on 
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September 10 （Weekly Diamond, October 11, 2008）. The standard price is 100 in this 
table. Such a drastic drop in its holdings, to one third its previous value, ultimately led 
to the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Q2　 　Q3
Alt-A 63　→　39
Subprime 55　→　34
CDO 35　→　29
　The IMF published an estimate of their losses in the Global Financial Report issued 
in April and October, 2008 （Table 2）．
　According to Table 2, the estimated total loss in housing loans was 225 billion 
Table 2   Estimates of Potential Writedowns in the Financial Sector for April and October, 2008 
（in billions of US dollars）
Writedowns on US loans Writedowns on US Loans
Outstanding 
loans
April 
estimated 
losses
October 
estimated 
losses
Banks Insurance Pensions/savings
GSE and 
Government
Other 
Hedge 
funds
Subprime 300 45 50 35-40 0-5 0-5 10-15
Alt-A 600 30 35 20-25 0-5 0-5 5-10
Prime 3,800 40 85 25-30 0-5 0-5 45-55 0-5
Commercial real estate 2,400 30 90 60-65 5-10 0-5 10-20
Consumer Loans 1,400 20 45 30-35 0-5 0-5 10-15
Corporate Loans 3,700 50 110 80-85 0-5 0-5 25-30
Leveraged Loans 170 10 10 5-10 0-5 0-5 0-5
Total for loans 12,370 225 425 255-290 5-40 0-35 45-55 60-100
Losses on Related Securities Losses on Securities
Outstanding 
loans
April 
estimated 
losses
October 
estimated 
losses
Banks Insurance Pensions/savings
GSE and 
Government
Other 
Hedge 
funds
ABS 1,100 210 210 100-110 40-45 35-55 10-15 10-25
ABS CDOs 400 230 290 145-160 55-75 30-45 15-20 15-30
Prime MBS 3,800 0 80 20-25 10-15 10-20 20-25 0-5
CMBS 940 210 160 80-90 20-25 15-35 10-20 15-20
Consumer ABS 650 0 0
High-grade 
Corporate debt
3,000 0 130 65-75 20-30 20-35 5-20
High-yield 
Corporate Debt
600 30 80 45-50 10-15 15-20 5-15
CLOs 350 30 30 15-20 0-5 0-5 5-10
Total for Securities 10,840 720 980 470-530 155-210 125-215 55-80 55-125
Total 23,210 945 1,405 725-820 160-250 125-250 100-135 115-225
Source: IMF, Global Financial Report, October, 2008
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dollars in April and increased to 425 billion dollars in October. The total loss on 
related securities was 720 in April and increased to 980 billion dollars in October. The 
total losses amounted to 945 billion dollars in April and 1.405 trillion dollars in October. 
Needless to say that there is a fear that this total may continue to grow with the 
Table 4  Estimates of US Banks Writedowns, 2007-2010　（in billions of U.S. dollars）
Estimated Holdings Estimated Writedowns
Loans
　Residential mortgage 2,981 230
　Consumer 1,115 195
　Consumer mortgage 1,114 100
　Corporate 1,104 72
　Foreign 1,745 57
Total for loans 8,059 654
Securities
　Residential mortgage 1,495 189
　Consumer 142 0
　Commercial mortgage 196 63
　Corporate 1,115 48
　Government 580 0
　Foreign 975 71
Total for securities 4,502 371
Total for loans and securities 12,581 1,025
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report Oct. 2009
Table 3   Estimates of US Potential Writedowns in the Financial Sector 2007-2010 （in billion of U.S. 
dollars）
United States Outstanding loans
Estimated Writedowns
Oct. 2008 April 2009
Loans
　Residential mortgage 5,117 170 431
　Consumer 1,913 90 187
　Consumer mortgage 1,914 45 272
　Corporate 1,805 120 98
　Foreign 2,669 80
Total for loans 13,507 425 1,068
Securities
　Residential mortgage 6,940 590 990
　Consumer 640 160 223
　Commercial mortgage 677 96
　Corporate 4,790 240 335
Total for securities 13,047 980 1,644
Total for loans and securities 26,554 1,405 2,712
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report April 2009
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increase in delinquencies.
　Losses have increased since the October, 2008 report. In the Global Financial Report 
of April, 2009, the total losses were estimated at 2.712 trillion （Table 3）. In the latest 
report, published in October, 2009, there was almost no change in the estimated loss 
although this report only estimated the potential loss by US banks, indicating the crisis 
may ﬁ nally have reached bottom （Fig. 4）．
From the Problem of Subprime Loans to the Current Financial Crisis
The delinquency of subprime loans has driven the investment banks who bought them 
from mortgage banks and securitized them as well as the hedge funds who proﬁ ted 
from the purchase of MBSs and CDOs to bankruptcy. In addition, stock prices fell 
dramatically, a credit shrinkage was triggered, and it damage was caused to the real 
economy. Let us trace the development of the recent crisis.
2006
　The price of the housing market in the United States begins to fall precipitously in  
2006.
　December: Mortgage banks that deal primarily in subprime loans begins to struggle. 
The mortgage bank Ownit Mortgage Solutions ﬁ les for bankruptcy.
2007
　April. 2: New Century Financial Co., No. 2 in volume in the subprime loan market, 
ﬁ les for bankruptcy.
　June 15: Bear Stearns, one of the major investment banks, provides 3.2 billion dollars 
for the relief of its subsidiary hedge fund.
　July: Moodies and S&P （a credit rating agency） lowers its ratings of subprime-
related securities.
　July 19-20: Bernanke, Chairman of the FRB, testiﬁ es in the Congress that the losses 
due to the ﬁ nancial crisis may amount to 50-100 billion dollars.
　August 6: American Home Mortgage ﬁ les for bankruptcy.
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　August 9: BNP Paribas, a French bank, refuses cancellation requests from investors 
for its three subsidiary investment funds. Financial anxieties are actualized 
（“Paribas Shock”）.
　September 7: Countrywide Financial, one of the biggest housing loan companies in 
the United States, announces that it will cut 10,000-12,000 employees by the end 
of 2007 （Countrywide Financial is acquired by the Bank of America for four 
billion dollars）
　September 15: The Northern Rock Bank in Britain encounters a run on the bank. 
（It is nationalized in February, 2008）
2008
　March: Bear Stearns is practically bankrupt and is acquired by JP Morgan Chase 
for 2.1 billion U.S. dollar.
　March 27: the FRB establishes the TSLF （Term Securities Lending Facility） which 
relieves ﬁ nancial institutions by exchanging MSBs etc. for Treasury Securities 
（the government bonds）, totaling approximately 400 billion U.S. dollar.
　September 7: Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac （GSE or Agency） are placed under the 
control of the US government, which decides to implement the Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreement of 200 billion U.S. dollar.
　September 15: Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, goes 
bankrupt. （with total assets of 639 billion U.S. dollar and total debts 613 billion 
U.S. dollar）The Dow-Jones shows a drop of 504 dollars. Merrill Lynch is sold to 
the Bank of America. AIG, the biggest insurance company in the United States, 
receives an 85 billion U.S. dollar loan from the government.
　September 21: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the largest and second largest 
investment banks, respectively, are transferred to bank holding companies. 
（Marking the disappearance of the ﬁ ve largest US investment banks）
　October 3: “The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”（the bailout of the 
U.S. ﬁ nancial system） is enacted, authorizing the government to spend up to 
700 billion U.S. dollar to purchase non-performing assets of ﬁ nancial institutions.
　October 6: Iceland declares a state of ﬁ nancial emergency.
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　November 14-15: A G-20 Leaders Summit is convened to discuss Financial Markets 
and the World Economy.
　December: Automakers GM and Chrysler receive bridge loans of 17.4 billion U.S. 
dollar from the government.
2009
　February 17: A $787 billion package of spending and tax cuts （the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act） is signed by President Obama.
　February 26: President Obama releases a proposed budget which would bring the 
2009 budget deﬁ cit to $1.75 trillion U.S. dollar.
　February 27: US government takes a 36% equity stake in Citigroup. US Department 
of Commerce announces that GDP growth fell by an annual rate of 6.2 percent 
in the fourth quarter of 2008.
　March 2: The US government decides to provide an additional 30 billion U.S. dollar 
to bailout AIG.
　In the context of this sequence of events, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008 has an especially important meaning. In contrast to Bear Stearns 
Fig. 9  Dow Jones Industrial Average
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and the two GSEs （Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac）, Lehman Brothers was not “bailed 
out” by the government and this resulted in signiﬁ cant repercussion in the stock 
market. One consequence was that the Dow Jones index fell precipitously following this 
event （Fig. 9） and did not recover to the level existing before until the end of 2012. It 
is not surprising that commercial banks have been reluctant to loan money, since the 
value of their property has fallen dramatically and they have suﬀ ered signiﬁ cant losses 
due to the subprime loan crisis （“Credit crunch”）. The shrinkage of the ﬁ nancial 
market has also had a variety of impacts on the real economy. Moreover, eﬀ ects have 
been felt not only in the United States, but around the globe, with the fall in stock 
prices in other countries leading to similar problems of unemployment, credit shrinkage 
and recession.
　It is important to consider why the government chose to bail out AIG, while it did 
not choose to bail out Lehman Brothers. AIG received relief because it is the US’s 
largest insurance company and it sold a large volume of CDS （Credit Default Swap） 
that served as collateral for corporate bonds or securities, in case these could not be 
repaid due to bankruptcy etc. In 2007, the value of CDS worldwide reached 62 trillion 
dollars. It was feared that failure of the AIG-guaranteed CODs would lead to a 
dangerous collapse in global conﬁ dence of the market.
Global impacts （of the US Financial Crisis）
The ﬁ nancial crisis that originated in the United States has spread to the whole world. 
Among advanced countries worldwide, Britain has suﬀ ered the greatest losses. The 
government announced a bank-rescue plan on October 8, 2008 whereby they would 
inject up to 50 billion pounds into ﬁ nancial institutions. They also announced a second 
plan on October 13, calling for the injection of 37 billion pounds into three major banks, 
including the Royal Bank of Scotland （RBS）. Iceland that had achieved rapid economic 
growth through promotion of the ﬁ nancial sector was severely impacted by the 
ﬁ nancial crisis. Geir Haarde, Prime Minister of Iceland, declared a state of emergency 
on October 6, 2008, saying “In the worst case, there is a danger that the nation will go 
bankrupt along with its banks.” Iceland government nationalized all private banks, and 
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sold oﬀ  overseas assets.
　The ﬁ nancial crisis has also had a serious impact on the rising nations. The IMF and 
World Bank decided to support Pakistan, Belarus, Iceland, Ukraine, Hungary, Serb, and 
Kirgiz, immediately following the IMF’s decision to support Iceland.
Table 5  Indices of developing nations
Current Account
 / GDP
Short-Term Foreign 
Debt / Foreign 
Reserves
Loans from Foreign 
Banks / GDP
Total outstanding 
loans for domestic 
private sector / GDP
Iceland -8.0 267.9
Hungary -5.5 0.9 54.1 18.0
Poland -5.0 0.8 17.1 29.5
Estonia -11.2 0.2 78.7 21.5
Ukraine -7.6 1.0 9.5 63.9
Pakistan -6.9 12.1 -4.8 21.6
Vietnam -13.6 14.5 10.2 63.9
China 9.8 6.9 -1.1 17.5
Source: Weekly Economist, December 9, 2008, p.20
　The IMF considers these countries -- Iceland, Central and East European countries, 
and Baltics, etc. -- to be facing ﬁ nancial crisis. The common features of these countries 
are that they borrow from foreign countries even though their current balance is a 
deﬁ cit, and the balance of their domestic credits to the domestic private sector is large 
compared with GDP. Table 5 lists the countries having these features. The ﬁ gures of 
concern from the IMF’s standpoint are highlighted in gray.
Impacts on Asian economies
Finally, I would like to discuss the impacts of the global ﬁ nancial crisis on Asian 
economy. First of all, Asia has experienced relatively fewer losses directly linked to the 
subprime loan crisis. The total losses of the World’s 100 biggest banks, as of May, 
2008, are reported to be 379 billion dollars. Losses in the US and selected Asian 
countries are presented in Table 6. The total losses in Asia, excluding Japan, amount 
to only 10.8 billion dollars, or less than 3% of the 379 billion dollars. The current loss 
ﬁ gure is expected to be larger, because of additional losses which were not previously 
disclosed and newly incurred losses since May, 2008. （These may include losses 
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associated with securities that were issued by Lehman Brothers.） In any case, the total 
loss experienced by Asian countries is not as large as that of EU nations.
Table 6  Losses in Asian Economies Associated with the Subprime Crisis （in billion of U.S. dollars）
US Japan Korea China Malaysia Total Asia
157.7 8.7 0.4 2.8 0.1 19.5
Source: Asian Development Bank, The US Financial Crisis, Global Financial Turmoil, and Developing Asia: 
Is the Era of High Growth at an End?, Dec. 2008, p.25.
　In spite of the relatively small direct impact of the global ﬁ nancial crisis, the GDP 
growth rates of Asian economies dropped rapidly in the latter half of 2008 as is 
indicated in Table 7. China’s GDP growth rate dropped to 6.2% in the ﬁ rst quarter of 
2009 and those of the ASEAN 4 nations, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Philippines respectively dropped to -7.0, -6.2, 4.5 and 1.0%．The Asian economies most 
impacted by the crisis were Newly Industrialized Economies （NIEs）. The GDP growth 
rate of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea dropped to -8.9%, -8.1%, -7.9% and 
-4.2%. However, the GDP growth rates of the Emerging Asia nations （China, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Asian NIEs）, as a whole, did not fall 
below zero even during the worst period of Q1 in 2009. Thus, the impact of the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis on East Asian economies, compared to developed countries and other 
regions of the world, was not a severe.
　The primary reason for the rapid decrease in the GDP growth rates in Asia was the 
fall in exports to advanced countries. There is a strong correlation between the level 
of the Asian exports and the non-oil imports of G3 nations （US, EU and Japan）. As the 
economic growth of G3 declines, the level of their non-oil imports falls, and, with it, the 
level of Asian exports. Thus, it is apparent that, in the current crisis, the decrease in 
GDP growth rates of the G3 nations caused the fall in the exports of Asian economies. 
As indicated in Table 8, the export growth rate of Asian economies in Q3 and Q4 of 
2009 are all less than -20%．
　The declines in Asian NIEs GDP growth rates resulting from the decreases in 
exports are bigger than those of ASEAN 5 and China, because Asian NIEs have a 
greater dependency on exports （Table 9）. T. Ito （2010） conducted a regression 
analysis and show the positive correlation between the GDP decrease and the export 
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Table 7  Annual GDP growth rate （compared to the previous year, %）
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines China Vietnam India Japan
2008 Q1 5.5 7.6 7.2 8.1 6.3 7.5 6.2 3.9 10.6 7.5 8.5 1.4
Q2 4.4 5.7 4.2 3.2 5.2 6.7 6.4 3.7 10.1 6.5 7.3 -0.1
Q3 3.3 -1.2 1.2 -0.3 3.1 5.1 6.4 4.6 9.0 6.5 7.2 -0.6
Q4 -3.3 -7.5 -2.6 -3.7 -4.1 0.2 5.0 2.8 6.8 6.2 6.1 -4.7
2009 Q1 -4.2 -8.1 -7.9 -8.9 -7.0 -6.2 4.5 1.0 6.2 3.1 5.8 -9.4
Q2 -2.1 -6.6 -3.4 -2.0 -5.2 -3.9 4.1 1.6 7.9 3.9 6.1 -6.6
Q3 1.0 -1.4 -2.0 1.9 -2.8 -1.2 4.2 0.5 9.1 4.3 7.9 -5.6
Q4 6.3 8.8 2.5 5.3 5.9 4.6 5.4 1.4 10.7 5.5 7.3 -0.5
2010 Q1 8.7 13.1 7.9 16.5 12.0 10.3 5.7 8.4 11.9 5.9 9.4 4.9
Q2 7.6 12.9 6.4 19.8 9.2 9.4 6.2 8.9 10.3 6.1 8.8 4.4
Q3 4.5 11.6 6.6 10.6 6.6 5.5 5.8 7.3 9.6 6.6 8.4 6.0
Q4 4.9 6.2 6.4 12.5 3.8 5.0 6.9 6.1 9.8 6.8 8.3 3.3
2011 Q1 4.3 7.4 7.6 10.2 3.2 5.2 6.5 4.9 9.7 5.4 7.8 0.0
Q2 3.5 4.6 5.1 2.0 2.7 4.3 6.5 3.6 9.5 5.6 7.5 -1.6
Q3 3.6 3.5 4.0 6.0 3.7 5.7 6.5 3.2 9.1 5.8 6.5 -0.5
Q4 3.4 1.2 3.0 4.0 -8.9 5.3 6.5 4.0 8.9 5.9 6.0 -0.3
2012 Q1 2.8 0.6 0.7 1.5 0.4 5.1 6.3 6.5 8.1 4.8 5.1 3.4
Q2 2.4 -0.1 0.9 2.3 4.4 5.6 6.4 6.0 7.6 4.8 5.5 3.9
Q3 1.6 0.7 1.5 0.0 3.1 5.3 6.2 7.2 7.4 5.1 5.3 0.2
Q4 1.5 4.0 2.8 1.5 19.1 6.5 6.1 7.1 7.9 5.4 4.5 0.4
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
Table 8  Export Growth Rate （compared to the previous year, %）
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines China Vietnam India Japan
2008 Q1 17.4 17.5 10.7 21.2 23.1 19.6 31.9 2.8 21.4 69.0 45.9 20.5
Q2 23.1 18.5 8.1 26.4 28.2 29.1 29.6 5.5 22.4 60.1 49.0 17.6
Q3 27.0 8.0 5.6 21.2 26.1 21.4 27.9 4.1 23.0 22.7 61.2 12.9
Q4 -9.9 -24.7 -1.8 -13.9 -10.7 -12.9 -5.6 -22.3 4.3 -8.9 7.4 -10.0
2009 Q1 -25.2 -36.7 -21.5 -32.7 -20.7 -28.9 -31.8 -36.8 -19.7 -37.2 -25.8 -40.6
Q2 -21.1 -32.0 -12.4 -30.8 -26.2 -33.3 -26.2 -28.9 -23.4 -24.8 -29.6 -34.0
Q3 -17.6 -20.9 -13.8 -22.4 -17.7 -26.4 -19.3 -21.5 -20.3 -1.5 -31.8 -24.5
Q4 11.7 16.9 -2.0 11.8 11.7 10.1 23.9 6.0 0.2 31.9 14.7 -1.0
2010 Q1 35.8 52.5 25.8 38.3 31.6 44.8 54.3 43.0 28.7 41.5 61.6 48.3
Q2 33.1 46.2 23.9 36.6 41.4 32.5 36.8 33.5 40.9 21.8 29.0 40.8
Q3 22.7 27.1 27.4 27.3 21.9 21.5 27.7 40.3 32.2 14.5 30.9 28.3
Q4 23.8 20.9 14.2 22.4 20.8 12.8 28.9 21.8 24.9 15.6 42.4 19.4
IMF, International Financial Statistics
Table 9  Exports Dependency （Exports/GDP, %）
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines China Vietnam India Japan
2007 41.9 72.1 208.0 217.7 69.2 106.2 29.4 43.3 38.4 76.9 20.4 16.0
2008 53.0 73.0 212.4 233.2 71.7 99.5 29.8 36.9 35.0 77.9 23.6 16.1 
IMF, International Financial Statistics
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dependency rate. China also experienced a decline in exports but the decrease in the 
growth rate was oﬀ set by massive public investment and increased ﬁ xed capital 
formation in 2009.
　The robustness of the Chinese economy has become the driving force behind the 
recovery of the Asian economies. Almost every Asian economy demonstrated greater 
growth in Q4 of 2009 than in Q1 of the same year. This recovery has also resulted in 
the re-appreciation of exchange rates starting in March, 2009 （Table 10）, following a 
precipitous fall after September, 2008. In addition, stock prices in almost every Asian 
economy have been on an upward trend starting in March, 2009.
　Thus, as a whole, Asian economies were in the process of recovery in 2010. It is 
evident that the current global economic crisis is more severe than the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997. This is because the impacts of the 1973 crisis were limited to 
Asia and these did not lead to serious problems in the real economy. Thus, it remains 
unclear how soon the Asian economies will recover. However, the governments of 
Table 10  Exchange Rates of Asian Economies （local currency/US dollar）
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines China Vietnam India Japan
2008 Jan 942.54 32.37 7.80 1.43 30.43 3.27 9400 40.78 7.24 15987 39.28 107.92
2009 Jan 1352.27 33.33 7.76 1.49 34.90 3.57 11148 47.11 6.84 17477 48.71 90.35
2010 Jan 1139.67 31.90 7.76 1.40 33.05 3.38 9275 46.00 6.83 18474 45.90 91.22
2011 Jan 1119.14 29.11 7.78 1.29 30.56 3.06 9035 44.19 6.60 19497 45.38 82.63
2012 Jan 1142.18 30.01 7.76 1.28 31.55 3.11 9055 43.55 6.32 20976 51.11 76.93
2013 Jan 1066.76 29.09 7.75 1.23 30.06 3.04 9652 40.72 6.22 20843 54.24 89.10
IMF, International Financial Statistics
Table 11  Official Unemployment Rates in Selected Asian Countries （%）
Economy 2006 2007 2008 2009
China, People’s Republic of 4.8 4.0 3.3 5.1
Hong Kong, China 4.8 4.0 3.3 5.1
Indonesia 10.5 9.8 8.5 8.1
Korea, Republic of 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.8
Malaysia 3.3 3.2 3.0 4.0
Philippines 8.2 7.4 8.0 7.5
Singapore 2.2 2.5 1.8 3.0
Taipei, China 3.8 3.9 3.8 5.1
Thailand 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.1
Viet Nam 4.8 4.6 4,6 N.A.
ADP, Key Indicators for Asia and the Paciﬁ c 2009, p.9
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Asian economies studied the bitter experiences of 1997 and correspond quickly by 
implementing ﬁ scal and monetary policies. Moreover, since each economy held 
suﬃ  cient foreign exchange reserves, exchange rates were not severely disturbed.
　After 2008, the most serious problem experienced in the real economy is an 
increase in the unemployment rate of almost all Asian economies （Table 11）. The 
increase in unemployment has a particularly severe impact for low income populations. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether unemployment rates will decrease concurrent to 
recovery of GDP growth rates and stock prices.
What went wrong?
What were the causes of the global ﬁ nancial and economic crises? As is evident from 
the discussion above, the root causes are deregulation of ﬁ nancial markets, speculative 
transactions and derivative dealings developed by ﬁ nancial engineering.
　However, I think that the more essential problem lies in economic theory that places 
excessive trust in the regulating ability of the market mechanisms （monetarism） and 
economic policies based on monetarism. This economic theory whose inﬂ uence has been 
increasing in the US since the introduction of “Reaganomics” in the 1980’s has gained 
prominence since the election of the Bush administration in 2000. The belief in the self-
correcting nature of market mechanisms has led to the weakening of regulation and 
oversight of ﬁ nancial markets, and increasing income inequality.
　It is reasonable to conclude that the ﬁ nancial crisis in 2007-8, which resulted from 
the overextension of subprime loans to lower income brackets, clearly shows the 
defects of such economic theory and an economic system built on such thought. To say 
that the subprime crisis resulted from “making loans to people to whom such loans 
should not have been made” is not incorrect, but the more essential problem is the 
system that produces such low-income populations and that loans money to them. It 
can be argued that not dealing with social inequalities inevitably brings about economic 
instability.
　Iceland chose to build their economy on the ﬁ nancial sector, and Central and East 
European countries chose to rely heavily on foreign investments to support their rapid 
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development and goal of westernization. But these countries were in the middle of the 
ﬁ nancial crisis after 2008. This illustrates the importance of maintaining a balance in 
the process of economic development. The demise of several major ﬁ nancial institutions 
in the United States indicates that the days of globalization, funded by ﬁ nancial capital 
of the United States and backed by the IMF, may be coming to an end.
What is the future of the World economy?
The direct inﬂ uences of the 2007-8 economic crisis came to an end in 2010. However, 
under the inﬂ uence of the crisis, the US economy is still in stagnation. The economies 
of EU countries also fell into a serious depression due to the ﬁ nancial crisis of some 
member countries such as Greece and Spain. As Hattori （2001） points out, the US 
economy seems to follow the failure of the Japanese economy after 1990’s. As the 
former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Bernanke, who once recommended Japan 
to take a drastic monetary relaxation policy to escape from the stagnation, was forced 
to take the same policy in the US. Although the monetary relaxation policy is 
necessary under this kind of situation, it alone cannot increase money demand and thus 
cannot escape from the deﬂ ation. We also need to execute massive ﬁ nancial policies to 
increase the domestic demand as Krugman （2012） proposed. However, the US, EU 
countries and Japan all are facing a budget deﬁ cit problem and cannot execute 
eﬀ ective ﬁ scal policies. Thus, it is quite probable that these economies will be caught 
up in the stagnation for a long period of time. To avoid such a situation, we should 
restore the consumption demand in our society by revitalizing the middle class.
　On the other hand, Asian economies have not suﬀ ered as directly or as severely as 
those of the US and Europe from the ﬁ nancial crisis. The biggest problem that Asian 
countries are now facing is a recession caused by a decrease in exports. To avoid a 
further recession, it is necessary for Asian countries to reduce income inequalities in 
their own countries and take a more balanced approach to the economic development.
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